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THE BATTLE OF REAM'S STATION.
BY GEORGE K. DAUCHY.

I

[Read May 8, 1890.J

N the summer of 1864 the Army of the Potomac, after the
ineffectual assaults on the inner line of the enemy's works
which followed its first appearance in front of Petersburg, busied
itself in forming strong lines parallel to those of the enemy.
These consisted of forts, some closed and others open in the
rear, connected by field works, and all covered in front by
abattis, stretching as far south as the Jerusalem plank road.
There the lines, after approaching very closely to the enemy's
works, culminated in the strong fort known officially as Fort
Sedgwick, but universally in the army as Fort H ell, from the
continuous and deadly fire to which it was subjected both by
night and by day. Thereafter, bearing sharply to the southwest
for a mile or so, the lines were returned to our rear to cover
our camps. These returned works were unoccupied, but were
ready for use in case of an attack from that quarter, the greater
part of our forces being in the lines facing Petersburg. The
musketry firing on the front was incessant, with an occasional
outburst of artillery. Not, however, along the whole line; in
accordance with the tacit agreement of the men, the firing on
some parts of the line was sharp during the daytime, and on
other parts during the night, while only at the points where the
works closely approached each other, or where the colored
troops were in the trenches, was the firing kept up both night
and day.
Our ranks had been fearfully depleted by the incessant battles from the 5th of May to the 30th of June, during which
time we had lost in the Second corps 2 1,724 in killed, wounded,
and missing, in addition to the losses by sickness. This was
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out of a force of 28,330 with which we had crossed the Rapidan on the fourth day of May, although we had been reinforced
from time to time by the return of reenlisted veterans and convalescents, and more notably by several large regiments of heavy
artillery from the forts around Washington and in Maryland.
The losses, both of officers and men, were of the very best
material, seasoned by years of experience and accustomed to all
the exige'ncies of service.
We began, soon after arriving in front of Petersburg, to
receive recruits to replace those we had lost; but the men
received, principally drafted men and substitutes, although adding to our numbers, poorly replaced the splendid soldiers lost
in the Wilderness, at Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor. They
needed a long period of discipline and training to make them
comparable to those we had lost, and for this the continual service in the trenches gave very little opportunity.
A little incident in regard to the Fifth New Hampshire regiment, occurring somewhat later on, will show the character of
a large part of the addition to our numbers. The Fifth New
H ampshire had been one of the very best regiments in the service, and I think I am correct in stating that it lost more men
in action than any other regiment in the Union armies. I t had
been commanded, until his death on the field of battle at Gettysburg, by the heroic Colonel Cross. T he r~giment had been
filled up largely by Canadians, who had come across the border
and enlisted for the sake of the large bounties. When I lay
with my guns in Battery Nine near the Petersburg and City
Point Road, this regiment was close by on my flank, and the
men deserted to the enemy to so great an extent that in the
chaffing across the lines which occurred every day about dusk
the rebels called on us to send over the flag and the colonel
to command the regiment, as the greater part of it had come
over to them.
The sanitary condition of the army was excellent, the country
around Petersburg being fairly healthy. The soil was sandy,
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generally covered by timber, with good water obtainable everywhere by digging from ten to twenty feet. We suffered much
from heat, however, having no rain for six weeks, from the
middle of June till the first of August, so that the air was filled
with dust raised by the supply wagons as they rolled along the
roads, furnishing us with an abundance of pepper for our food
without the necessity of troubling the Commissary Department.
We rested thus until the I 3th of August, if the continuous
fighting in the trenches, an occasional excursion to attack the
enemy's lines north of the James, and the fighting at the mine
could be called resting ; and, compared with the incessant and
bloody fighting of the first six weeks of the campaign, it appeared
quite peaceful. On that date the Second corps was sent to the
north of the James on the report that Lee had detached largely
to reinforce Early in the Valley; from there it was, after heavy
fighting, hurried to Petersburg on the I 8th and 19th to support
Warren in the movement to extend our left and obtain possession of the Weldon Railroad, a favorable opportunity for which
was afforded by the absence of the troops sent by L ee to the
north of the J ames to repel the attack made on him there. The
advancement of our lines to the Weldon Railroad was very desirable, having the double object of cutting that railroad as a source
of supply for the rebel forces, and of advancing our lines to a
point whence it might be possible to strike the railroad leading
from Petersburg to Lynchburg.
The country between our left and the Weldon Railroad being
heavily wooded, with t hick underbrush and traversed by obscure
wood roads, well known to the enemy but not to us, gave him
a fine opportunity to search for our flanks and strike our picket
lines. The movement thus gave rise to a series of severe
engagements attended with heavy losses on both sides, the final
result being that the enemy was defeated and driven off, and
our new lines strongly fortified and connection made with the
right near the Jerusalem plank road.
It was considered very desirable to destroy the Weldon Rail-
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road as far south as Rowanty Creek, twenty miles from Petersburg and eight miles from Ream's Station, to prevent the enemy
from using the railroad to bring supplies as near as possible to
our lines, and t hence to Petersburg by wagons around our left.
In order to effect this, General Hancock was ordered to take
t he F irst and Second divisions of his corps to Ream's Station,
first tearing up the road to that point, then to hold it with onehalf of his force and employ the remainder in destroying beyond
as far as practicable. T he troops, at the time of this movement,
were very much worn and fatigued, having been in continual
motion for twelve days; they had marched to the north of the
J ames, where the fighting had been severe, and back again
through the rain, over muddy roads, making their marches by
night. The infantry in the two divisions available for this duty
was from 6,000 to 6,500 strong, and in addition General Hancock had with him about 2,000 cavalry under General Gregg.
The First division began the work at noon of the 22d from
the vicinity of the "Yellow Tavern," also known as "Globe
Tavern," and by night of the 23d had reached Ream's Station.
T he Second division left Globe Tavern on the afternoon of the
23d, taking with it the Twelfth New York battery under my
command and the Third New Jersey battery; the Tenth Massachusetts and the consolidated Batteries A and B of the First
R hode Island were with the First division. T he T hird New
Jersey battery, commanded by Captain Woerner, known in
the corps as the "Dutch Battery," was well officered and well
disciplined, and did good and effective service; but the captain
was a little peculiar sometimes in his ideas of military duty.
One day the batteries of the corps, being in great part in service
in the forts, a vigorous cannonade broke out, putting all the
other batteries, and headquarters as well, on the alert for fear
of a sudden attack on some point. Aids and orderlies were hurriedly sent to every battery of the corps to find out the cause
of the sudden outburst. T he aids sent to the other batteries
found them all aroused and ready for action, but not firing. The
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one sent to Captain Woerner found him firing case-shot along
the line of the enemy's pickets, on a portion of which his position had an enfilading fire. In response to an inquiry as to the
cause of his firing, he replied:" Oh, I was firing at those pickets;
I likes to make them jump."
The Second division bivouacked for the night at the point
where the country road to Ream's Station leaves the Jerusalem
plank road, and at half-past three o'clock of the morning of the
24th marched to Ream's Station, arriving there about seven
o'clock in the morning. The Second division relieved the
pickets and the troops of the First division in the works, and
the troops of that division began the work of destroying the
railroad south of Ream's Station, which by nightfall they succeeded in doing effectually, as far as Malone's, three miles south.
At night on the 24th our signal officers reported, and General
Hancock and General Warren were notified, that a force of
the enemy, estimated at from 8,000 to 1 0,000, was marching
south from Petersburg around our left toward Ream's Station
by the Halifax and Vaughan roads.
T he works at Ream's Station had been thrown up by the
troops of the Sixth corps in the latter part of June, at the time
when they had been sent out to protect Wilson's cavalry on
its return from the raid on the L ynchburg and Petersburg Railroad. They were hurriedly thrown up, badly constructed, and
poorly located. Instead of using the railroad for a base, the
main line, facing west, was placed about twenty to thirty yards
west and not more than seventy to eighty yards from a wood
in front of and nearly parallel to the railroad. It was nearly
half a mile long, with openings in the centre and at each end
for the railroad and turnpike to pass through ; then, crossing
the railroad, both returns ran northeasterly for a distance of
about a thousand yards, forming an obtuse angle at the right
and an acute angle at the left, the returns being nearly parallel
to each other. The p_:irt of the railroad inside of the works
passed through a cut on the right and along an embankment on
9
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the left, so that with Sleeper's battery of four guns and one
section of Perrin's battery placed on the west front on the left,
it was difficult to supply them with ammunition from the caissons across the track, and impossible to withdraw them in case
of a reverse. The horses were also fully exposed to the fire of
the enemy over the low parapet.
The left return was fully as badly located, running at such
an angle that the men in the works were directly in range of
the fire from the enemy attacking the front line. The result
was that the troops of the Second division fought from one side
of their works when they were attacked by the enemy in their
direct front, and from the other side when they were subjected
to the fire of those attacking our lines from the west. The
right return was run parallel to a strip of woods at a distance of
two or three rods, the road to the station running along between
the woods and the works. G eneral Hancock had had no
thought of a battle here, or the works would have been reformed
and made tenable.
At nightfall of the 24th the troops were all drawn within
the works. On the morning of the 25th the Second division
started out to continue the work of destroying the railroad, but
soon encountered a large force of the enemy's cavalry supported
by infantry. The whole force fell back, and before noon was
again inside the works, the first division occupying the point
I
from the crossing of the railroad on the left, and the right
return, and the Second division the left return.
The artillery was posted as follows: Two guns of Perrin's battery on the left of the railroad, facing south, and two guns across
the railroad, facing west. Alongside of Perrin's two guns facing
west were Sleeper's four guns. The Twelfth New York battery
was posted about three hundred yards to the right of the church,
situated near the angle made by the right return with the railroad, where the works formed a little angle. Farther along to
the right was Woerner, who was afterwards, when the enemy
threatened our left return, moved to the cornfield in the rear of
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the woods, two of his guns bearing on the left of our front, near
where the left return began, and two facing south.
At twelve o'clock the enemy drove in the picket line and
advanced with some force on our works, but was quickly driven
back. At one o'clock he made a determined attack, advancing
to within thirty yards of our works before being repulsed. Our
picket line was reestablished and some prisoners taken. Shortly
after, another attack was made with a line of battle, and the
enemy's dead were left within three yards of our lines. Our
skirmishers on advancing again took some prisoners, from whom
we learned that the enemy was in strong force and was establishing batteries in our front. During this time the Twelfth
New York battery had been searching the woods to the west
of our front in which the enemy was lying, with solid shot and
shell, and had been firing shrapnel and canister as the enemy
appeared in the open, while the guns of the batteries on the front
were served with great effect on the advancing foe.
I wish to say here that the book of light artillery instructions
makes no mention of grape-shot; that in the Eastern army, and
I presume the same thing was true for all our armies, no grapeshot was issued to the field artillery during the war, although
plenty of canister was used. Still, I suppose that since nearly
all our histories speak so freely and fully of the firing of grapeshot, in the future it will be considered as an undoubted fact
that grape was used most abundantly.
During the 24th and the forenoon of the 25th my artillerymen had been listlessly lying around in the woods, in which were
placed our limbers, caissons, ambulance, etc., enjoying the luxury of" roasting ears " which we found in the field in the rear
of the woods. We did not think the enemy would send a force
large enough to attack us so far from his lines, and, in fact, considered the excursion rather in the light of a picnic. After the
attack made about two o'clock, General Miles, apprehensive
that the enemy would attack at the point where the railroad
ran through the works near the church, ordered me to send one
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gun from my battery to a point in front of the church just in
the rear of the railroad cut, to bear on the point where the railroad and the turnpike passed out of the works at the northwest
angle. I sent Lieutenant Brower, a brave and capable soldier,
with the gun. I hesitated about sending him as he was my
only officer, and in an occasion which might be so critical I
did not wish to be so short of help ; but I gave him his choice
of remaining with the battery or going with the gun, one gun
being a sergeant's command. He chose the path of honor.
Little did I think, as the gallant and brave young fellow passed
out of my sight into the woods, that I was never again to see
the true-hearted companion with whom I had messed for years.
He seemed to have a premonition that he would not return,
for, as he was riding away, he took out his watch and handed
it to the carrier of the guidon, a fine young soldier and protege
of his, and then, thinking apparently that such an act savored
of weakness, replaced it in his pocket. Shortly after that Captain Sleeper, of the Tenth Massachusetts, came riding by us
in the direction of the rear, wounded in the arm, and calling out
gaily as he passed us, "Thirty days leave."
The enemy had been so easily repulsed in his previous charge
that we felt little apprehension of his success in breaking our
lines or doubt of holding our position till night, when we could
withdraw. Meantime, two brigades of the Third division of the
Second corps under Colonel McAllister, and the Third division
of the Ninth corps, commanded by General Wilcox, had been
ordered up to our support; but, instead of coming by the Halifax
road, a broad turnpike and the direct route from Warren's line,
only four miles distant from Ream's Station, over which orderlies
and aids had been passing and along which we had a telegraph line,
they were moved over roads of more than double the distance
by way of the Jerusalem plank road. The time requisite for
passing over this route was so long that the crisis of the battle
was over before they reached the point on the Jerusalem plank
road from which the road to Ream's branches off; and the divi-
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sion of the Ninth corps was ordered forward to Ream's to protect our withdrawal, leaving the troops of the Third division of
the Second corps to hold the intersection against an attack by
the enemy's cavalry.
After the last charge spoken of above, the force of the enemy
was largely increased until it amounted in all to eight brigades
of infantry. Although no reports of the numbers of the enemy
are on file in the War Department, as near as can be determined
their numbers were from 10,000 to I 2,000 infantry, and Hampton reports his cavalry at from 3,000 to 3,500 men. The
enemy had placed eight guns in our front, serving them with
great vigor and effect, their fire being directly in our front, and
also having an enfilading fire on our left return, which forced
Gibbon's troops to the outside of their intrenchment to cover
themselves. In this position they were attacked by the enemy's
cavalry and McGowan's two regiments of infantry, against
which Gregg's cavalry, dismounted and protected by a light
breastwork of rails, and fighting with gallantry and efficienc:.y,
took up a position on our extreme left from which it had an enfilading fire on the enemy. The enemy made three light dashes
on our works in front at about a quarter past three, half-past
three, and again at five o'clock. Twenty minutes after the
last mentioned attack they opened upon our lines with a severe
fire from the eight guns placed in front amongst some pines and
close to our works, in order to shake the troops on whom the
attack was to be made. This fire was returned with effect by
the guns of the Tenth Massachusetts and the Rhode Island
battery, and from the right by the Twelfth New York with an
enfilading fire. The horses of the Tenth Massachusetts were
nearly all killed, and the Rhode Island battery had suffered to
nearly the same extent. At about 5:40 P. M. the artillery fire
of the enemy slackened, and a strong column of four brigades,Cooke, McRae, Lane, and Scales, - supported by Anderson's
brigade and three regiments of McGowan's brigade, advanced
against the northwest angle. The column was obstructed by
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the light slashing in front, and badly shaken by the fire it received
from both infantry and artillery. A rapid fire of canister was
poured into its flanks by the Twelfth New York battery on its
left, and by the Tenth Massachusetts and the Rhode Island
batteries on its right. Lieutenant Brower was killed almost at
the beginning of the charge, but his gun was most effectually
served until the enemy had nearly surrounded it.
The attack, so warmly received, was repulsed at most points,
but as a result of the bad conduct of the consolidated brigade
consisting of the Seventh, Fifty-second, and Thirty-ninth New
York regiments, it made a lodgment in our works and passed
through the gap in our entrenchments. General Miles, always
capable and efficient, had, by order of General Hancock, provided against such a contingency by placing across the railroad
cut, and twenty yards in the rear of the consolidated brigade, as
a reserve, four regiments of a small brigade he had received·
from General Gibbon to take the place of his troops on the
skirmish line on Gibbon's front. The fifth and largest regiment of this brigade was sent outside of the works, to join the
picket and cavalry skirmish line, and to attack the enemy in
flank and rear as he charged on the works. General Miles
says t hat five minutes more of good fighting would have driven
the enemy out, and that we had every reason to believe that the
enemy would not only be repulsed but attacked in flank and
rear by the troops outside the works.
As the enemy came inside of our works, General Miles
stood on the bank at the cut, and, as a rebel color- bearer came
over the parapet almost at his feet, he looked for Colonel R ugg,*
commanding the four regiments of the reserve, and, not finding
him at the moment, gave the order himself to Rugg's brigade
to rush into the cut and commence firing. T o his astonishment, they either lay down on their faces or ran to the rear.

* This officer was aftenvards dismissed from the service for incompetency and disobedience of orders in the movement on the Boydton plank
·
road in October.
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In the language of General Morgan, inspector-general of the
corps, " These regiments remained like a covey of partridges
until flushed and captured almost en masse." When it is considered that a regiment so renowned as the Twentieth Massachusetts was included amongst these, it can be seen what an
utter change there was in the character of the material comprising them. On the utter failure of this reserve to act, General Miles moved to the left where the Fourth brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Broady, was fighting gallantly,
and ordered it to move to the right ; but as the enemy was now
pouring into the gap in heavy force and coming over the works
as his front was cleared, the Fourth brigade was driven off and
the rebels captured the left of our west line. Granger of the
Tenth Massachusetts fought his guns to the last, retiring from
one gun to the next, until the enemy, as he fired his last charge
of canister, rushed upon his left piece. Then, leaping the
embankment, he escaped with his men, having no horses to
limber with, even if it had been possible to draw the guns over
the embankment at that point. The following is an extract
from the memorial address of Hon. Charles M. Stedman,
Wilmington, N. C., May 10, 1890, in which he mentions this
attack:
"In truth the Federal infantry did not show the determination which had generally marked the conduct of _Hancock's
corps. Not so with the Federal artillery. It was fought to
the last with unflinching courage. Some minutes before the
second assault was made, General McRea had ordered Lieutenant Kyle with the sharpshooters to concentrate his fire upon
the Federal batteries. Many men and horses rapidly fell under
the deadly fire of these intrepid marksmen. Yet still the artillerists who were left stood by their guns. When McRea's
brigade crossed the embankment, a battery which was on his
right front as he advanced wheeled to a right angle with its
original position and opened a fire of canister at close quarters,
enfilading the Confederate line. General McRea immediately
ordered this battery to be taken. Although entirely abandoned
by its infantry support, it continued a rapid fire upon the attack-
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ing column until the guns were reached. Some of the gunners
even refused to surrender and were taken by sheer physical
force. They were animated in their gallant conduct by the
example of their commanding officer. He was a conspicuous
target and his voice could be distinctly heard encouraging his
men. Struck with admiration by his bravery, every effort was.
made by General McRea, Captain Oldham, Captain Bingham,.
and one or two others who were among the first to reach the
guns, to save the life of the manly opponent. Unfortunately,
he was struck by a ball which came from the extreme Bank
and he fell mortally wounded, not more lamented by his own
men than by those who combatted him."
The action of the One Hundred and Fifty-second New York,
the regiment of Gibbon's division sent outside to attack the
charging column of the enemy in Bank and rear, was no less
disgraceful than that of the four regiments of the same brigade
in reserve by the angle. Captain Martin, a division inspectort
and a cool and reliable officer, reports that not a shot was fired
at it, but that it broke and ran in a disgraceful manner, only
two men in the regiment discharging their pieces.
The enemy now formed in column on the road leading to
our right on the inside of our works, with a force also advancing
outside of the breastworks. General Miles i:ode up to the
Twelfth New York battery and ordered one gun to be turned
to sweep the road inside the breastwork as soon as our troops
were out of the way. He then endeavored to form a line across.
the woods running along to the left of the road, but with no
success, as it was broken up about as fast as he formed it. As
soon as the enemy had moved his column out of the cover of
the woods and was advancing along the road, the gun of the
Twelfth New York battery was fired into the head of the column with a triple charge of canister. The road over which the
enemy advanced was hard and smooth and the best possible for
the effective use of canister, as the bullets which did not strike
the enemy dire1::tly did so on the rebound. The column melted
away under the fire, and when the smoke arose no trace of it
appeared.
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The part of the enemy's force which was advancing under
cover of the woods, easily driving away the men Miles had
been able to collect to oppose them, came out on the left of the
battery, which Miles, on seeing the inefficiency of the force
formed across the woods to hold the enemy, had ordered to
withdraw. The enemy, seeing the movement, fired a volley
disabling the wheel horses on two limbers so that the guns
could not be limbered. The third piece limbered and moved
down the road a few yards when its horses fell, and the gun
could not be withdrawn further at the time, but it was beyond
the point reached by th_e advancing enemy. On giving the
order to" limber to the rear," in obedience to the command of
General Miles, I went into the woods and mounted my horse
and started out to lead off the battery. As I turned toward
the guns I saw the position was full of rebels, and I galloped
a short distance away to the point where Hancock and Miles
were rallying the troops. This part of the line was retaken
very quickly ; but, owing to the singular interpretation by the
provost guard of their orders to let no unarmed men go to the
front, the cannoneers were unable to return to their guns, and,
having taken the lanyards with them to prevent the guns being
used by the enemy, fire could not be reopened by the battery.
This was the farthest point reached by the enemy, and but a
comparatively small number came so far. Meanwhile, the
Third New Jersey battery, under Captain Woerner, supported
by a few troops collected by General Hancock, was fighting
most gallantly and effectively from the cornfield back of the
woods. Firing upon the enemy along the left return of our
Jines and upon the left of our front where there was no timber
to obstruct his range, he, aided by the splendid service of the
cavalry, prevented the enemy from advancing on our left. The
Second division had, with very few honorable exceptions, done
almost nothing to stem the tide, notwithstanding the most
urgent efforts of Gibbon and his staff and a large part of his
officers. The men broke and could not be rallied, although
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Gibbon says that the enemy's efforts, after capturing our line,
were feeble, and that a fraction of the spirit manifested on a
hundred occasions by this old division of Sedgwick would have
given us a most complete success. In how many bloody conflicts and heroic engagements had the same division been led
by Gibbon himself!
In the mean time, General Hancock and General Miles, with
their staffs and numerous officers, were making the most strenuous efforts to form a line to oppose the enemy's advance, which,
on account of his heavy losses, was very feeble. The Sixtyfirst New York stood up staunchly to the work, and, acting as
a base for a line of the broken men formed both outside and
inside of the works and at right angles to them, this regiment
drove the enemy gradually back to the angle at the church,
reaching the gun lately commanded by Brower. General Miles
at dark placed two hundred men outside on the enemy's flank
and rear and drove him back ; he said that if he had had a brigade he could have swept the enemy's troops from the field
with great loss of prisoners, as they were then in great confusion.
General Miles says in his report: "In going to the front, I could
hear the enemy's men calling out their regiments. I felt confident his loss was m uch heavier than ours, that his confusion
was equal, and that I could retake all my line."
The reinforcements had not arrived on the field, and at eight
o'clock orders were given to withdraw. This was done, the
provost guard and the Sixty-first New York bringing up the rear
and helping to get off the guns and carriages of the Twelfth
New York battery by hand until horses could be brought to
draw them away.
The gunner of one of the pieces had been wounded in the
bowels, but managed to get behind a large tree and lie down just
beyond the point where the left of the battery had rested, but
farther than the enemy had come. As I came along when our
troops retook that part of the field, he handed me a large sum
of money, from $ 150 to '1,175 I think (we had been paid off
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a few days before and he had had no opportunity to send the
money home), together with his watch and other valuables, with
a request to send them to his family. At about ten o'clock,
when I had had all my carriages drawn off, I put him on the
last caisson; but the jolting along the rough road, through the
woods, over stumps, and through ruts, caused him so much suffering that he begged me to lay him down by the side of the
road and let him die. I could not listen to such a request, notwithstanding the agony he endured, but carried him ·along to the
field by the Jerusalem plank road, where the battery and troops
were assembled preparatory to returning to the Petersburg lines.
There he died and was buried in a lonely field. He was an
excellent man and as good and faithful a soldier as I ever knew.
The heavy losses, the destruction of the advancing column
by the Twelfth New York battery, together with the admirable
service of W oerner's guns, aided by the cavalry, had broken up
the organization of the enemy's forces and he made no further
effort to advance after the little force gathered together by Hancock and Miles had driven him back to the angle by the church.
During the night he withdrew his troops and returned to Petersburg, fearing, doubtless, that if he remained so far from his
works he might be attacked with overpowering force the next
day, or that advantage might be taken of the absence of so many
troops from Petersburg to break through his lines at some
weaker point.
By daylight on the morning of th~ 26th all our troops were
in their camps around Petersburg and the most humiliating event
in the history of the Second corps was over. The bearing of
Hancock on this occasion was, as always, most admirable. The
disposition of the troops was of the best, all contingencies were
guarded against and provided for, and the heavy losses inflicted
on the enemy and his inability to follow up the advantage he
had gained, notwithstanding the great preponderance of his
forces, were due to the action of Hancock, Miles, and other
officers, who, even after the breaking of the lines, would have
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snatched victory from defeat if but a small part of Gibbon's
forces could have been depended upon. General Hancock had
his horse killed under him, his bridle-rein cut by a bullet, and
was continually galloping along the front encouraging the men
in the ranks and urging the stragglers to resume their places in
the lines and do their duty. The conduct of Miles was no less
admirable, as on all occasions, always at the point where he was
most needed and making the best dispositions of the forces under
his command.
From this lowest point, the corps recovered gradually,
becoming in October, with the return of many of its officers
and soldiers from absence caused by sickness and wounds,
capable of showing, in the action on Hatcher's Run, that it
had renewed its old spirit. It was ready at the opening of the
campaign in the spring to act with all its old fire, well worthy
of the renown it had gained through its years of service, and to
prove that it could dare and do as much as on the terrible day
of the fight at the angle at Spotsylvania.

